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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-ESTABLISHMENT

CLAUSE-The United States Supreme Court has held that state

educational programs providing remedial and enrichment courses
within leased parochial school facilities violate the Establishment
Clause of the first amendment.

Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
In 1976, the School District of Grand Rapids, Michigan, began
providing classes to nonpublic school students on nonpublic school
premises through its Community Education and Shared Time pro-

grams.' Forty of the forty-one participating schools were sectarian.2 The school district paid the cost of the programs; including
the cost of leasing nonpublic school classrooms. s
Both programs were administered by a public school employee
with input from private school administrators as to which classes
would be provided.4 The courses offered by the two programs had
not previously been taught in the nonpublic schools.5 Each classroom utilized in either program had to be secular in appearance
while in program use; a sign identifying the classrooms as public
school facilities was posted during program classes.6 While the two
programs were administered similarly, there was one significant
1. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3218 (1985). The Shared Time
program provided classes attended by nonpublic school students during the normal school
day and was offered only in the nonpublic schools. All of the classes were also provided in
the public schools on a regular basis. Id. at 3218. The Community Education Program was
offered to children and adults in various locations throughout the school district. These
classes were offered in nonpublic school facilities and were held at the conclusion of the
regular school day. Id. at 3218-19.
2. Id. 3220. Twenty-eight of the schools participating in the program were Roman
Catholic, seven were Christian Reformed, three were Lutheran, one was Baptist, and one
was Seventh Day Adventist. Id. at 3220 n.4.
3. Id. at 3218. Each elementary school classroom was leased at a cost of $6 per week
and each secondary school classroom was leased at a cost of $10 per week. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 514 F. Supp. 1071, 1077
(W.D. Mich. 1982).
4. 105 S. Ct. at 3219.
5. Id. at 3218-19. The Shared Time Program courses included subjects such as art,
music, physical education, remedial reading, remedial mathematics, enrichment reading and
enrichment mathematics. The Community Education Program included courses in various
arts and crafts, personal enrichment, and language subjects. Id.
6. Id. at 3220. In addition, any religious symbols were removed from the classrooms
while program courses were taught; common hallways, however, could contain indicia of the
religious nature of the schools. Id.

1237

1238

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:1237

difference between them. The Shared Time program utilized only
full-time employees of the school district while the Community
Education Program utilized full-time teachers from the non-public
schools hired by the school district as part-time public employees.'
Challenging the constitutionality of the two programs, six taxpayers filed suit in the United States District court for the Western District of Michigan against the School District of Grand
Rapids and a number of state officials.' The basis of the taxpayers'
challenge was that the programs violated the Establishment Clause
of the first amendment of the United States Constitution.9 Following a lengthy hearing, the district court permanently enjoined the
school district from operating either program, holding that the effect of the programs was to provide a constitutionally impermissible direct benefit to sectarian institutions. 10 The school district appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which
affirmed." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 2
and affirmed, holding that: "[T]he Community Education and
Shared Time programs have the 'primary or principal' effect of advancing religion and therefore violate the dictates of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."' 3
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority of the Court, 4 began
by delimiting the scope of the Establishment Clause. 15 According
to Justice Brennan, the Establishment Clause was not limited to a
prohibition of a single designated state religion, nor was it restricted to a guarantee against state discrimination among reli7. Id. at 3219.
8. Id. at 3221. See Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. School
Dist. of Grand Rapids, 546 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
9. 105 S. Ct. at 3221. The Establishment Clause of the first amendment provides
that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
10. 546 F. Supp. at 1093-94.
11. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand
Rapids, 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983). According to Judge Edwards, writing for the majority
of the panel: "The [Programs] . . . violate the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution because the programs have the primary effect of advancing religion, and because the programs involve an excessive entanglement with religion." Id. at 1405.
12. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
13. 105 S. Ct. at 3230.
14. Id. at 3218. Justice Brennan's majority opinion was joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part, as did Justice O'Connor. Justice White and Justice
Rehnquist each filed a dissenting opinion.
15. Id. at 3221-22. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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gions.6e Rather, the clause was to prohibit support of, or involvement in, religion by government. 17 The Court based its analysis of
the disputed programs on the three-part test first enunciated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,5 which provided that the Establishment
Clause prohibits state action having a non-secular purpose or a primary effect of promoting or hindering religion or which would involve an excessive entanglement of church and state. 9
The Court held that both the Shared Time and Community Education programs had secular purposes and therefore satisfied the
first part of the Lemon test.2 0 Justice Brennan then evaluated the
primary effects of the disputed programs to determine their compatibility with the second prong of the Lemon test. Focusing this
investigation on the nature of the schools in which the programs
operated, Justice Brennan found that the sectarian nature of the
schools was undeniable. 2 1 As a result, the Court held that the programs in question tended to promote religion in three distinct
ways: The teachers involved in classes at such sectarian schools
could intentionally or accidentally teach religious ideals; the children could perceive the government (school district) programs as
supportive of their respective religions; and, the programs could
advance religion by subsidizing the schools' religious purposes.
Taking each of the three aspects in turn, Justice Brennan first
noted that the teachers could be influenced by the religious environment in which they were to teach and convey a religious message to their students.2 3 This could not be permitted, asserted Jus16. 105 S. Ct. at 3221.
17. Id. at 3221-22.
18. 405 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra note 83. In Lemon, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute which purported to provide for the purchase of certain secular education
services from parochial schools by reimbursing such schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks,
and instructional materials associated with secular subjects (A Rhode Island statute which
sought to supplement parochial school teachers' salaries was also invalidated as part of a
consolidation of cases by the Court). Id. For an extended discussion of Lemon, see infra
notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
19. 105 S. Ct. at 3222-23. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
20. 105 S. Ct. at 3223.
21. Id. See supra text accompanying note 2.
22. 105 S. Ct. at 3223-24.
23. Id. Justice Brennan pointed out that the Community Education Program was
especially prone to utilization by teachers as a vehicle for religious messages because fulltime teachers in religious schools would have difficulty putting their desire to further the
religious nature of their schools aside. Id. at 3225.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, who dissented as to the Shared Time Program, agreed with the majority that the use of parochial school teachers was a fatal flaw in
the Community Education Program. See infra notes 32 & 37 and accompanying text.
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tice Brennan, since the prohibition of government-aided religious
indoctrination is absolute and therefore risks of indoctrination are
to be avoided. 24 The fact that no incidents of indoctrination in either program had been reported was inconclusive in the Court's
view because there had been no public monitoring of the program
classes, and the parties involved would have had no incentive to
report such incidents.2 5
As to the second reason for the impermissible effect of the disputed programs, Justice Brennan noted that the state must avoid
fostering a symbolic appearance of government support of religion
in the eyes of either proponents or opponents of religion.2 6 The two
programs involved impressionable children who could not be expected to perceive the government presence as less than a showing
of state approval of their religious choice.2 7 Such a perception, said
Justice Brennan, would not be dissolved simply by posting classrooms as public school facilities.2 8
Finally, Justice Brennan indicated that religious institutions
could benefit from state financial assistance only incidentally or indirectly if the mandates of the Establishment Clause were to be
satisfied. 29 Because the religious schools involved in these programs were seen to have dual but inseparable functions of secular
and sectarian education, state assistance which relieved the need
for secular curriculum expansion would, according to the Court,
substantially and directly benefit the institution.3 0
24. 105 S. Ct. at 3224. The Court supported the absolute prohibition concept by citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (Kentucky statute requiring posting of
ten commandments in public school classrooms held unconstitutional), Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975) (Pennsylvania statute providing instructional equipment which could be
used to teach religious subjects as well as secular subjects held unconstitutional), and
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also cases cited infra note 103.
25. 105 S. Ct. at 3225-26. But see infra note 46 and accompanying text.
26. 105 S. Ct. at 3226. See also infra text accompanying note 98 (suggesting specific
dangers attendant to public perceptions of church-state cooperation).
27. 105 S. Ct. at 3226-27. "The symbolism of a union between church and state is
most likely to influence children of tender years, whose experience is limited and whose
beliefs consequently are the function of environment as much as of free and voluntary
choice." Id. at 3226. Cf. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (maturity of college students an important factor in approval by the Court of government assistance to religiously
affiliated colleges).
28. 105 S. Ct. at 3227.
29. Id. at 3228. The Court cited as an example of a permissible incidental benefit, a
program providing state-funded bus transportation to nonpublic school students. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 320 U.S. 1 (1947). For an extended discussion of Everson, see infra
notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
30. 105 S. Ct. at 3229-30. The Court reasoned that although the ultimate beneficiaries of the programs would be the children, "[N]o meaningful distinction can be made
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Having held that the Shared Time and Community Education
programs had the effect of promoting religion in the three ways
discussed above, the Court considered an evaluation of the entan31
glement portion of the Lemon test to be unnecessary.
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment of the Court
with regard to the Community Education program, but, for the
reasons stated in his dissent in Aguilar v. Felton,3 2 he dissented as
to the invalidation of the Shared Time program.33 The Chief Justice had asserted in Aguilar that the invalidation of a program providing public remedial classes in parochial schools, without showing how these classes would lead toward establishment of religion,
was erroneous.3 4 Such an action, according to the Chief Justice, reflected nothing more than an unfounded fear that religious school
35
sponsors would exploit the programs for religious ends.
Justice O'Connor also concurred in the Court's judgment with
regard to the Community Education program but dissented with
respect to the Shared Time program.3 6 While agreeing with the
majority that the Community Education program had the actual
effect of advancing the religious goals of the parochial schools because of the influence of full-time parochial school teachers on stubetween aid to the student and aid to the school . . . ." Id. at 3229. Religious schools, according to the Court, may well have offered such courses themselves had the government
program been unavailable. The courses were in the same general subject areas as courses
already being taught in the parochial schools and, the Court noted, a danger existed that
these schools would discontinue their present courses so that public programs would later
provide them. The Court feared that the state could gradually become the the "prime supporter of the religious system" under the guise of assistance to students. Id. at 3230.
31. 105 S. Ct. at 3230 n.14.
32. 105 S. Ct. 3285 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In Aguilar, a case decided the
same day as Grand Rapids School Dist., a New York City program which provided public
school teachers for certain remedial courses of instruction within religious schools was invalidated by the Court. In this respect, the New York City program was very much like the
Community Education program offered in Grand Rapids. Unlike the Community Education
program however, the New York City program did provide some public supervision of the
public employees while in parochial schools. According to the Aguilar Court, this supervision resulted in an excessive entanglement of church and state and therefore the New York
program was found unconstitutional. Id. at 3226.
The Aguilar decision, in conjunction with the Grand Rapids School Dist. decision, demonstrates the difficulty which inheres in simultaneously satisfying the effects element and
the entanglement element of the Lemon test. For a further discussion of this difficulty, see
infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
33. 105 S. Ct. at 3231 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also infra note 46 and
accompanying text.
35. Id.
36. 105S. Ct. at 3231 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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dents,3 7 Justice O'Connor's dissent distinguished Shared Time program teachers as full-time public employees who, based on the
record, had never sought to indoctrinate their students with religious tenets. 38 Justice O'Connor also dissented as to the Shared
Time program for the reasons stated in her dissent in Aguilar.3 9
In her Aguilar dissent, Justice O'Connor had noted a logical flaw
in the Court's conclusion that public offerings of remedial education services in parochial schools directly subsidized religious efforts.4 0 In particular, Justice O'Connor was critical of the suggestion by the majority that the parochial schools, by being relieved of
the burden of providing certain courses themselves, would be directly and unconstitutionally subsidized in their religious function.4 ' According to Justice O'Connor, this conclusion did not
square with the decision by the Court in Wolman v. Walter,4 2 in
which publicly funded courses provided to parochial school students off the parochial school premises were adjudged constitutional.43 Justice O'Connor asserted that parochial schools would be
relieved of no greater financial burden when classes were held inside parochial schools than when they were provided outside as approved in Wolrnan."
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion,4 5 stressed that
neither program in Grand Rapids could be said to pose an unreasonable risk of indoctrinating students in religion when no evidence of such indoctrination had been presented." In addition,
Justice Rehnquist asserted that the disputed programs created less
of a symbolic link of church and state than other governmental
activities which the Court had approved in prior cases. 7 But most
37. Id.
38. Id. See also infra note 46 and accompanying text.
39. 105 S. Ct. at 3231 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
also Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3243 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
40. 105 S. Ct. at 3245-46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). For a detailed discussion of the Wolman decision see infra
notes 112-122 and accompanying text.
43. See 433 U.S. at 247.
44. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct at 3246 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
45. Grand Rapids School Dist., 105 S. Ct. at 3216, 3231-32 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
46. Id. at 3232 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) According to Justice Rehnquist, "Not one
instance of attempted religious inculcation exists in the records of the school aid cases decided today, even though both the Grand Rapids and New York [Aguilar] programs have
been in operation for a number of years." Id.
47. Id. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (upholding municipal erection
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damaging to the majority's conclusions, according to Justice Rehnquist, was the reliance on case law which for some time had misconstrued the mandate of the Establishment Clause as being a total prohibition of state support of religion.
In fact, Justice
Rehnquist insisted, such a complete prohibition was not required
under the clause. 9
Justice White, in a dissenting opinion,5 also insisted that the
decision of the Court was not required by the Establishment
Clause. 1 Justice White pointed to his dissenting opinions in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,5 2 and Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,5 s as providing the reasons for his dissent.5'
of a nativity scene as part of a municipal Christmas display despite religious significance of
creche); Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983) (upholding payment of legislative chaplain with public funds).
48. 105 S. Ct. at 3132 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Compare, e.g., McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 248 (1947) (Reed, J., dissenting) ("I agree that [governmental entities] cannot 'aid' all or any religions . . . . But 'aid' must be understood as a purposeful
assistance directly to the church itself or to some religious group or organization doing religious work of such a character that it may be fairly said to be performing ecclesiastical
functions.") [and] F.W. O'BRIEN, JUSTICE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1958) with
School Dist. of Abbington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 229 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Financing a church either in its strictly religious activities or in its other activities is
equally unconstitutional, as I understand the Establishment Clause.") See also infra notes
49 & 60.
49. 105 S. Ct. at 3231-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) Justice Rehnquist also cited Wallace v. Jafree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2508-20 (1985) (Rehnquist J., dissenting) as providing reasons
for his conclusion that the Court has misinterpreted the mandate of the Establishment
Clause. In Wallace, following a lengthy historical analysis of the Establishment Clause, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Clause prohibits nothing more than the creation of a
state religion and governmental discrimination between religions. State assistance to religious institutions, if provided in a non-discriminatory way, according to Justice Rehnquist,
should be permitted. 105 S. Ct. at 2516-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
50. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3248 (1985) (White J., dissenting). Justice White filed a single dissenting opinion for both Grand Rapids School Dist. and
Aguilar. See 105 S. Ct. 3285 (1985).
51. Grand Rapids School Dist., 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3249 (White, J., dissenting).
52. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (White, J., dissenting). In Lemon, Justice White had emphasized a need to consider the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment in conjunction
with the Establishment Clause when evaluating aid to parochial schools. According to Justice White, the Free Exercise Clause at least permits states to purposely fashion secular
programs which would indirectly benefit religious institutions. Since Justice White considers
the secular and religious functions of parochial schools to be separable, he believes that
state aid to the secular function should be permitted even though the religious function may
also incidentally benefit. Id. at 664 (White, J., dissenting). For a general discussion of the
interplay of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause see Young, Constitutional Validity of State Aid to Pupils in Church-Related Schools; Internal Tension Between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 783 (1977).
53. 412 U.S. 756 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). In Nyquist, Justice White asserted
that a significant public interest was served by government programs which helped maintain
the financial viability of parochial schools. As long as the public aid given to the schools was
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The Supreme Court's reliance on Lemon in its Grand Rapids
decision was consistent with its accepted practice when considering
cases involving church-state relationships in the field of education. 5 And yet, the Court cautioned that the Lemon test should
not be mechanically applied, but serves only as a guideline for
evaluations of possible breaches of the Establishment Clause.56 For
this reason an examination of the development of the Lemon test
is indispensable to an understanding of the flexibility and breadth
of the Court's Establishment Clause analysis in education cases.
An analysis of the origin of each of the Lemon test elements- pur57
pose, effect, entanglement- will be particularly useful.
5 the Court evaluated a New
In Everson v. Board of Education"
Jersey program which provided reimbursement to parents of parochial school students for the cost of bus transportation between
home and school.5 9 The central issue, according to the Court, was
whether the program in question had breached the wall of separation between church and state which the Framers had intended
when the Establishment Clause was included in the first amendment.6 0 In upholding the program, the Court adopted a theory of
directed to a secular function, the removal of some of the financial burden of the parochial
schools and the improved chance of the survival of such schools was not only permissible,
but was admirable. Id. at 822-24 (White, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 98-99 and
accompanying text.
54. Grand Rapids School Dist., 105 S. Ct. at 3248 (White, J., dissenting). See supra
notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
55. See Grand Rapids School Dist., 105 S. Ct. at 3222. As the Court noted, "We have
particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the education of our children." Id.
56. Id.
57. The Grand Rapids School Dist. Court credited Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968) as being the source of the effect prong of the Lemon test, and Walz v. Tax
Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), as the origin of the entanglement element of the test. 105 S.
Ct. at 3222.
Actually, the purpose and effects elements of the Lemon text can be further traced to
cases as early as Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (See infra notes 58-63 and
accompanying text) and School Dist. of Abbington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text).
58. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id. at 18. The concept of the Establishment Clause erecting "a wall of separation
between church and state" arose in a letter written by Thomas Jefferson shortly after the
adoption of the first amendment. According to Jefferson, "I contemplate. . . that act of the
whole American people which declared that their Legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof' . . . [as erecting] a
wall of separation between Church and State." 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H.
Washington ed. 1861).
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Everson found historical support for Jeffer-
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government neutrality in dealings with religious institutions.6 1
Since the transportation program in Everson was intended to provide general welfare assistance in the interest of safety for school
children, the exclusion of parochial school students would, according to the Court, be more objectionable than the incidental benefits which accrued to parochial schools.2
Neutrality of government action was satisfied by the challenged
program according to the Everson Court, because the state had
been seeking to fulfill a social welfare purpose, and the effect was
only incidentally, not primarily, to benefit religious institutions.6
But it was not until more than a decade later in School District of
Abbington Township v. Schempp,a" that the Court specifically announced that the purpose and effect of a challenged statute was
critical to the neutrality demanded by the Establishment Clause.6 5
son's wall metaphor. But, while the majority believed that history revealed that the wall was
meant to ensure government neutrality toward religion (see infra note 61), the dissenters
believed that history called for a wall which would prohibit any government assistance from
flowing to religious institutions. 330 U.S. at 33-34 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). But see Wallace
v. Jafree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2508-12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) in which Justice Rehnquist suggested that history did not support the wall of separation as being the intent of the
Framers. See also supra note 49. See generally R. CORD,SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STAT&
HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 3-47 (1982).
61. 330 U.S. at 18. According to the Everson Court, "[The First] Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be
used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." Id.
The required neutrality was reflected in the Court's first attempt to comprehensively define the Establishment Clause:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force or influence a person to go or to remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious belief or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Id. at 15-16.
62. Id. at 16. Cf. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 253 (1977) (cost of busing parochial
school students on school-directed field trips may not be publicly subsidized since parochial
schools control timing and content of field trips and could thus use the trips to benefit the
school's religious function directly). See infra note 115.
63. Id. at 17. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (statute prohibiting
Sunday sales of merchandise upheld as having a primary effect of improving public health
by providing uniform day of rest for all citizens and only a coincidental effect of benefiting
religion by facilitating church attendance).
64. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
65. Id. at 222. The Schempp Court stated that the neutrality demanded by the interplay of the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause yielded a "test [that] may be
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In Schempp, the Court ruled that a Pennsylvania statute which
required Bible readings within public schools violated the Establishment Clause's neutrality requirement." In the Court's view, the
purposeful introduction of religious exercises into the public
schools constituted a sufficient departure from state neutrality as
to invalidate the statute. 7 An evaluation of the effect of the statute was unnecessary since the absence of a secular purpose precipitated the statute's invalidation. 8
The Court's first specific application of both the purpose and the
effect elements of the standard enunciated in Schempp came in
Board of Education v. Allen.6 9 In Allen, the Court upheld a New
York law which required local school boards to lend textbooks at
no cost to parochial school students.70 The Court held that the
statute had both a secular purpose and a primary effect that
neither promoted nor repressed religion and was, therefore, constistated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is
the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution." Id.
66. 374 U.S. at 226. Even though the individual students were excused from participating in the Bible readings upon parental request, the Court noted that it is not necessary
that individuals be coerced into religious involvement in order to have a breach of neutrality. Id. at 223.
67. Id. at 223-24. The proscription of religious exercises within public schools had
previously been addressed by the Court in McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948). In McCollum, the Court held that an Illinois board of education which had permitted use of public school facilities for religious instruction had acted unconstitutionally. The
Court insisted that its holding reflected no hostility toward religion but instead would protect religious interests by keeping government out of the sphere of religion. 333 U.S. at 21112. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1951). In Zorach, the Court upheld a New York
program which permitted public school students to leave the premises in order to receive
religious instructions. According to the Court, the release of students so that they might, of
their own choice, attend religious instructions was an accommodation to religion which was
necessary in order to maintain government neutrality toward religion. 343 U.S. at 315. For a
further discussion of some of the accommodations to religious pluralism which are made by
public schools, see AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

31-53 (1964).

68. 374 U.S. at 223-24. Relatively few statutes have been struck down by the Court
because they lacked a secular purpose. Those which have are limited to statutes which
sought to introduce religion into public schools. See Wallace v. Jafree, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985)
(statute requiring a moment of silent prayer or meditation within public schools held to
violate the Establishment Clause); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (statute requiring
posting of ten commandments in public schools unconstitutional); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (statute prohibiting use in public schools of textbooks which disagree
with biblical teachings was unconstitutional); and Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (statute providing an official state prayer for recital in public schools ruled unconstitutional).
See also supra note 67.
69. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
70. Id. at 238.
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tutional.7 ' The purpose of the law, which was the promotion of the
educational enrichment of children, was clearly secular in the
Court's view. 72 This purpose was legitimately served by the statute
because the loan of textbooks, like the provision of bus transportation approved in Everson, was simply making the benefits of a general social welfare program available to all children. 7 The textbooks, which were provided directly to children, were only for
secular subjects and were not considered to be helpful to the religious function of parochial schools, so the effect of the program
was only to indirectly benefit religious institutions.7 '
A program of much more substantial benefit to religious institutions, namely tax exemptions for religious property, was evaluated
by the Court in Walz v. Tax Commissioner7 and was also found to
be constitutional. 6 Chief Justice Burger, in his majority opinion,
asserted that the program had the legitimate secular purpose of
preserving the contributions to community stability provided by
churches and other tax-exempt organizations." The fact that
churches benefited from the tax exemption did not, in itself, negate this legitimate purpose, said the Chief Justice, for as indicated
by the Court's earlier decisions in Everson and Allen, government
could be benevolent in its neutrality toward religion."
Continuing his inquiry into the validity of tax exemptions for
religious properties, Chief Justice Burger noted that the effect of
government actions must not be "an excessive government entanglement with religion. ' 79 Since the disputed tax exemptions would
entail less government involvement with religious institutions than
assessing and taxing church property, the entanglement was not
71. Id. at 243.
72. Id.
73. Id. The Court noted that, "Appellants have shown us nothing about the necessary
effects of the statute that is contrary to its stated purpose. The law merely makes available
to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school textbooks free of charge." Id.
74. Id. at 248. In the Court's view, "[We] cannot agree . . . that all teaching in a
sectarian school is religious or that the processes of secular and religious training are so
intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of religion." Id. But see infra note 90 and accompanying text.
75. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
76. Id. at 673.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 669. See also supra notes 62 & 74 and accompanying text.
79. 397 U.S. at 674. The Court emphasized that, "In analyzing either alternative [taxation or exemption from taxation), the questions are whether the involvement is excessive,
and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to
an impermissible degree of entanglement." Id. at 675.
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considered excessive.80
It was unclear at the time of the Walz decision whether the
Court intended the entanglement of church and state to be merely
illustrative of the sort of effect which would advance or inhibit religion, or whether "entanglement" was being added to the "purpose"
and "effect" requirements announced in Schempp.8 1 But just one
year later in Lemon v. Kurtzman82 entanglement was listed by the
Court as the final criteria in the now-famous three-part test for
analyzing Establishment Clause cases.8 3 Not only was entanglement given a role independent of the effect consideration but the
84
role was a significant one.
Since the Lemon test has been heavily relied upon in subsequent
Establishment Clause cases, a careful examination of the Lemon
decision is essential to a proper understanding of the scope and
8 5
significance of Grand Rapids School District.
In striking down Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes which
sought to subsidize nonpublic education, 88 the Lemon Court's entanglement analysis was more extensive than the simple lesser-or80. Id. at 674.
81. Compare Note, Tax Exemptions, Subsidies and Religious Freedom after Walz v.
Tax Commission, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 876, 894-95(1970) [and] Werling, The Granting of Tax
Exemptions by States for Religious Properties used for Devotional Purposes does not Violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, 2
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 161, 172 (1971) (both suggesting that entanglement is a criteria to be considered in the evaluation of effect), with Note, Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New
York, 16 VILL. L. REv. 374, 366-67 (1970) [and] Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MICH. L. Rav. 179, 202 (1971) (both suggesting
that the entanglement evaluation was a new standard in addition to the effect criteria). See
also Zaetewey, Excessive Entanglement: Development of a guideline for assessing acceptable church-state relationships,3 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 279 (1976) (a useful discussion of the
confusion generated by the Walz holding as clarified by subsequent Supreme Court
decisions).
82. 403 U.S. 602 (1970). See also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
83. Id. at 612. Specifically, the Court noted that,
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria
developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our
cases. First the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion [citations
omitted] finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive entanglement with religion" [citation omitted].
Id. at 612-13. See also supra note 58.
84. 403 U.S. at 613-14. In fact, the entanglement criteria was the deciding factor in
the Court's decision in Lemon. Id.
85. Indeed, the Lemon test has been utilized by the Court in every subsequent case
in which the constitutionality of government assistance to parochial education has been
questioned. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 18.
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two-evils approach enunciated in Walz. 7 Again writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Burger noted that the first step in the analysis
of entanglement was an examination of the nature of the recipient
of governmental assistance, along with the type of assistance flowing to the recipient.as Such a preliminary investigation would make
it possible to determine whether excessive entanglement inhered in
the relationship created by the statute. 9
In Lemon, most of the recipients of state assistance were parochial schools having an avowed purpose of inculcating religion.9 0
The challenged assistance was a subsidy of that part of teachers'
salaries attributable to secular education." Despite state requirements that were supposed to limit assistance to non-religious education, 2 the Court noted that the continuing danger of the teachers injecting religious principles during subsidized class time would
require extensive state monitoring of both school administration
and the classroom.9 3 The resulting entanglement of church and
state was, according to the Court, intolerable, and the statutes
were struck down as violative of the Establishment Clause. 4
The Lemon Court also noted a significant difference between the
Pennsylvania teacher-subsidy program and the busing and books
assistance approved by the Court in Everson and Allen, respectively.9 5 In both of these prior cases, financial assistance was provided to the children or their parents, whereas the Pennsylvania
87. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
88. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 608. Both the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes directed assistance
to all nonpublic schools, but in each case over 90% of the schools receiving assistance were
church-related schools and most of those were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church.
Id. at 608-10.
91. Id. at 607. Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion in Lemon strongly asserted
that parochial schools could not separate their religious mission from their secular mission.
"A school which operates to commingle religion with other instruction cannot completely
secularize its instruction. Parochial schools in large measure, do not accept the assumption
that secular subjects should be unrelated to religious teaching." Id. at 636-37 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
92. Id. at 609-10. The Rhode Island statute required that any teacher, to be eligible
for assistance, teach only secular subjects and employ only materials also in use in public
schools. Each Rhode Island teacher also had to agree in writing to avoid teaching any religion as long as his or her salary was being supplemented by the state. The Pennsylvania
program required schools seeking reimbursement to follow specific accounting methods in
order to differentiate time spent in secular and in sectarian education. The state would then
audit the school's accounts. Id.
93. Id. at 619.
94. Id. at 620.
95. Id. at 621. See supra notes 58-63 & 69-74 and accompanying text.
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program sought to subsidize parochial schools directly.96 This direct influx of governmental financial assistance into parochial
schools exacerbated the level of entanglement by necessitating an
97
ongoing public audit of the parochial schools.
In delivering a dissenting opinion in Lemon, Justice White
stressed the value of parochial education to society as a whole,s
and insisted that the secular and sectarian functions of parochial
schools are separable.9 9 The interplay of the effects and entanglement elements of the Lemon test, according to Justice White,
would make legitimate government assistance to secular education
in these schools difficult if not impossible.1 00 Both the parochial
schools and the states providing assistance would be willing to take
steps to insure that government aid would not have the effect of
promoting religion, but, as a result of such steps, the church and
state would automatically become impermissibly entangled. 10 1 In
short, Justice White asserted that the Court had created an "insoluble paradox" for the states. 10 2
96. Id. The Rhode Island program had directly subsidized the school teachers rather
than the parochial schools employing them. See supra notes 18 & 92.
97. Id. Justice Brennan, foreshadowing his majority opinion in Grand Rapids School
Dist., delivered a concurring opinion in which he noted that, "A subsidy, involves the direct
transfer of public monies to the subsidized enterprise and uses resources exacted from the
taxpayers as a whole....
[The] state forcibly diverts the income of both believers and non
believers to churches." Id. at 652-63 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 690-91 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). See also supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
98. 404 U.S. at 662 (White J., dissenting). This viewpoint was also crucial to Justice
White's dissent in Grand Rapids School Dist. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying
text.
The majority in Lemon had conceded that the parochial schools had value to society, but
Chief Justice Burger, in dicta, introduced a further consideration in evaluating the interaction of church and state engendered by government assistance to parochial education. According to the Chief Justice, the programs in dispute in Lemon, if approved, would be followed by continued and increasing demands for public financial aid to religious education.
The resulting contest between those considering such appropriations warranted and those
believing that tax dollars should be otherwise allocated would be carried to voting booths
and to the floors of legislatures. This would divide communities on religious grounds and
exacerbate church-state entanglement while diverting political attention from other matters
of greater urgency. 403 U.S. at 622-23.
99. 403 U.S. at 663 (White J., dissenting). See also supra note 52 and accompanying
text.
100. Id. at 668.
101. Id. But cf. supra note 91 and accompanying text.
102. Id. Cf. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held a
Pennsylvania program of tuition reimbursement to parents of parochial school students to
be unconstitutional. According to the Court in Sloan,
In holding today that Pennsylvania's post-Lemon v. Kurtzman attempt to avoid the
Establishment Clause's prohibition against government entanglements with religion
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Undaunted by Justice White's forecast of failure for state attempts to assist parochial education, a number of jurisdictions
have, since Lemon, attempted to fashion programs which would
pass constitutional muster. 03 In an apparent effort to provide assistance which could be characterized as both neutral and insulated from the need for entangling surveillance, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, two years after Lemon developed several
new programs of assistance to parochial schools.'04 These programs, which provided auxiliary services within parochial schools,
loans of instructional materials and equipment to those schools
and loans of textbooks to parochial school students were evaluated
by the Court in Meek v. Pittenger.0 5
has failed to satisfy the parallel bar against laws having a primary effect that advances religion, we are not unaware that the appellants and those who have endeavored to formulate systems of state aid to nonpublic education may feel that the decisions of this Court have, indeed, presented them with [an] "insoluble paradox"...
IT]he "fault" lies not with the doctrines which are said to create a paradox but rather
with the Establishment Clause itself.
413 U.S. at 535.
103. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (Minnesota tax deductions for parents sending their children to nonpublic schools upheld); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975) (Pennsylvania loan of textbooks to parochial school students found constitutional but
provision of counseling services, testing services, educational materials and certain health
services struck down); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (New York
program seeking to reimburse parochial schools for teacher-prepared test administration
and records administration costs struck down); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (Pennsylvania attempt to reimburse parents for parochial school tuition found unconstitutional);
and Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (New York attempt to subsidize maintenance costs of parochial schools, provide tuition grants, and certain tax benefits
found unconstitutional). For a general review of Supreme Court treatment of various sorts
of assistance to nonpublic education, see generally Annot., 63 L. Ed.2d 804.
The states had some reason to believe that acceptable programs could be developed. In
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), a case decided by the Supreme Court on the same
day as Lemon, the Court had determined that a federal program which provided construction grants to religiously affiliated colleges and universities was not violative of the Establishment Clause.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Tilton, emphasized a critical difference between aid to institutions serving college students and aid directed toward grade school and
high school students. The natural skepticism of college students, according to the Chief
Justice, would serve as a barrier to religious indoctrination. Since the program was providing bricks and mortar which were inherently neutral, and since student skepticism as well as
the predominantly secular nature of college level courses would obviate the need for monitoring the institutions, the effect and entanglement elements of the Lemon test were simultaneously satisfied. Furthermore, he noted, the construction grants would entail a single
injection of government assistance rather than a continuing financial relationship between
government and religion. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
104. See Acts of July 12, 1972, Nos. 194 & 195 [1972] Pa. Laws 861, 863 (codified at
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 9-972 to -973 (Supp. 1975)).
105. 421 U.S. 239 (1975).
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Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in Meek, noted that the
textbook loan program was indistinguishable from the one approved by the Court in Allen, and was therefore constitutional. 06
But while the textbooks were loaned directly to students, the instructional materials and equipment flowed directly to the parochial schools.107 Given the religious nature of the recipient schools,
direct aid, even in the form of admittedly neutral charts, maps and
slide projectors, was impermissible. 10 8 Direct assistance to schools
in which sectarian functions were predominate was considered direct assistance to religion.109
The flaw in the auxiliary services program, according to the
Court, was of a different nature. Those services, which included
counseling, testing, remedial and therapeutic services, although
provided directly to nonpublic school students in need of them,
were still held unconstitutional because they were provided within
parochial school facilities. 11 0 Thus, in Meek, the Court revitalized
the "effect" prong of the Lemon test. Assistance which was, on its
face, neutral and non-sectarian, and which had no apparent need
of entangling government surveillance, could still be invalidated either because of the nature of the recipient or the nature of the
premises on which the assistance was offered. 1
In Wolman v. Walter,11 2 the considerations developed in Meek
were applied by the Court in its evaluation of an attempt by the
Ohio legislature " to assist nonpublic education."" The Ohio effort
106. Id. at 360-61.
107. Id. at 362-63. Section (e) of Act 195 read in relevant part: "Pursuant to requests
from the appropriate nonpublic school official on behalf of nonpublic school pupils, the Secretary of Education shall have the power and duty to purchase directly. . . and to loan to
such nonpublic schools, instructional materials and equipment, useful to the education of
such children." Act of July 12, 1972,No. 195 [1972] Pa. Laws 863 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 9-973 (Supp. 1975)).
108. 421 U.S. at 365.
109. Id. at 366. See also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 367-69. Even though public employees would be providing the services,
there was a significant risk, according to the Court, that the employees could succumb to the
religious environment in which they were to work and unwittingly join in the school's sectarian mission. The lack of safeguards against this risk, the Court concluded, left the program
with at least a potential effect of advancing religion. Id. at 372.
111. See supra notes 97 & 110 and accompanying text.
112. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
113. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page 1985).
114. 433 U.S. at 229. According to the Court, the Ohio effort was obviously an attempt
to adapt a program of assistance to the Court's earlier Establishment Clause cases. Id. at
233.
The Ohio program offered assistance in the form of textbook loans, standardized tests and
test scoring services, speech, hearing and psychological diagnostic services, therapeutic and
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was largely successful as the Court found most of the forms of assistance to be constitutional. 1 5
A textbook loan provision of the Ohio program was considered
analogous to the provisions approved by the Court in Allen and
Meek and was summarily approved by the Court on that basis. " 6
The Court also approved that provision of the Ohio program which
provided standardized tests directly to parochial schools, noting
17
that the tests were identical to those given in public schools.'
Like the secular textbooks, the tests were sufficiently insulated
from adaptation to ideological presentation to satisfy both the effect and entanglement elements of the Lemon test.11 8
Diagnostic services provided to parochial school students were
also insulated from adaptation to religious ends, noted the Wolman Court, even though they were provided within parochial
schools. " Public employees who provided the services could still
be affected by the environment, but since their task within the parochial schools lacked educational content it was not viewed as susremedial services, instructional materials and equipment loans to pupils, and field trip
transportation services to parochial school students. Id. at 229.
115. Id. Only the loans of instructional materials and equipment and the provision of
field trip transportation were found unconstitutional by the Court. According to the Court,
the loans of instructional materials and equipment to students rather than to their schools
did not sufficiently distinguish the Ohio provision from that which had been struck down in
Meek. While provision of the materials directly to children was an important factor, the
loaned materials and equipment were still utilized in parochial schools at the direction of
parochial school teachers. As a result they could be used as tools in the process of religious
instruction. Id. at 250.
The field trip transportation services were similarly distinguished by the Court from the
transportation assistance approved in Everson. Unlike the Everson busing program, these
field trips were directed by the parochial school administrators and geared toward curriculum which was considered to be envoloped in religion. Therefore, "[Tihe schools, rather
than the children, truly [were] the recipients of the service and ... this fact alone may be
sufficient to invalidate the program as impermissible direct aid." Id. at 253.
116. 433 U.S. at 237-38.
117. Id. at 239. The Court noted that in Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S.
472 (1973), a New York program which reimbursed nonpublic schools for administration of
both standardized and teacher-prepared tests had been held invalid. The basic difficulty in
Levitt, however, and one not present in Wolman, was the risk that internally prepared tests
could be drafted in such a manner as to test religious principles. Id. at 240.
118. Id. at 240-41. In the Wolman Court's view, "the inability of the school to control
the test eliminates the need for the supervision that gives rise to excessive entanglement."
Id.
119. Id. at 242. The Court in Meek, had noted that, "'speech and hearing services'
... at least to the extent such services are diagnostic, seem to fall within that class of
general welfare services for children that may be provided by the State regardless of the
incidental benefit that accrues to church-related schools." Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
371 n.21 (1974).
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ceptible to becoming a vehicle for ideology. 2 " Similarly, the Wolman Court upheld publicly provided therapeutic services,
including guidance counseling and remedial education of parochial
school students. 2 1 Since those services were only furnished away
from the parochial school premises, and by public employees, environmental pressures to utilize those services for religious ends were

absent. 122
In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,12 s the Court addressed
yet another state effort to provide educational services to parochial
school students in a manner which would satisfy the Lemon test.
The state strategy this time was to split the horns of the dilemma
created by the effect and entanglement prongs of the Lemon test
by secularizing the sectarian atmosphere of the parochial school. It
was hoped that public leasing of classroom space in parochial
schools and removal of religious objects from the classroom would
at once overcome the environmental deficiencies inherent in Meek,
while replicating the neutral-site characteristic of the programs ap24
proved by the Court in Wolman.
The fact that the Grand Rapids School District Court did not
see the leasing of space in the parochial school as any real distinction from the program rejected in Meek is neither surprising nor
unwarranted. The risk of teachers succumbing to their environment, which was crucial to the Meek decision, rested more with the
teachers' perceptions of their environment than with the technical
characterization of the classroom as publicly or religiously con120. 433 U.S. at 244.
121. Id. at 247.
122. Id. Neither would the provision of remedial services involve entanglement of
church and state in the Wolman Court's view. "It can hardly be said that the supervision of
public employees, performing public functions on public property creates an excessive entanglement between church and state." Id. at 248.
123. 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
124. The school officials in Grand Rapids had reason to be optimistic about the success of their programs. A Michigan Appellate Court had, after Lemon, upheld the shared
time and community education concepts. According to the Michigan court, the fact that the
parochial school as lessor of the classroom space would have no authority concerning activity within the classroom was significant. Since the content of the activity in classes would be
that of a public school, the Michigan alternative was considered distinguishable from the
flawed Pennsylvania programs in Meek and Lemon. Citizens to Advance Pub. Educ. v. State
Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, 65 Mich App. 168, 237 N.W.2d 232 (1976).
The Michigan Supreme Court, shortly before Lemon was decided, had also held that as
long as the subject matter, teachers, and classrooms are controlled by public authorities, the
coincidental location of the classroom in a nonpublic school building would not make a program unconstitutional. Traverse City School Dist. v. Attorney General, 384 Mich. 390, 185
N.W.2d 9 (1971).
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trolled."" Whether officially a public classroom or a parochial
classroom, the teachers could not be expected to consider themselves more than guests, teaching parochial school students at the
sufferance of parochial school administrators. When this perception is combined with the delivery of educational services which
are prone to ideological presentation, the risk of religious indoctri126
nation remains.
It seems therefore, that the ultimate decision in Grand Rapids
School District would have been justified solely on the basis of the
precedent set in Meek and Wolman. 1"7 But the Court chose to
enunciate not one, but three reasons that the Grand Rapids programs impermissibly affected the advancement of religion. In addition to the fact that they were offered on parochial school premises, the programs failed because they fostered a perception of
governmental support of religion and because they relieved religious schools of the burden of providing classes at their own expense. 18 Unfortunately, it is possible that the future significance of
the Grand Rapids School District case may rest with these latter
two flaws enunciated by the Court. By listing three reasons for the
failure of the effects element of the Lemon test, the Court has laid
the groundwork for what some may consider to be a test within a
test. 2 '
A standard which would provide definition to the effects prong
of the Lemon test would be welcome for the predictability which it
could generate in future Establishment Clause evaluations.' 30 But
125. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 247-48.
126. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 111 & 121-22.
128. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
129. Potentially the "effect" prong of the Lemon could be construed to require satisfaction of a "Grand Rapids" test. If this should happen, it would not be the first time that
the Court gleened a new test from earlier efforts to describe the sort of effects which would
be constitutionally impermissible. The entanglement element of the Lemon test was originally spoken of by the Court in Walz as an impermissible effect. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
See also supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
130. Justice White, in the majority opinion in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444
U.S. 646 (1980), remarking about the inconsistency of the Court's holding in Establishment
Clause cases noted that,
what is certain is that our decisions have tended to avoid categorical imperatives and
absolutist approaches at either end of the range of possible outcomes. This course
sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility, but this promises to be the case
until the continuing interaction between the courts and the States . . . produces a
single, more encompassing construction of the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 662.
See also Wallace v. Jafree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) where Justice
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unless the elements of the standard are consistent with prior case
law, confusion and not predictability would be produced. Herein
would be the danger of adopting a three-part standard for evaluation of the effects of church-state relationships based on the three
considerations listed by the Court in the Grand Rapids School
District case.
The most glaring inconsistency in the Grand Rapids School Dis131
trict holding, as pointed out by Justice O'Connor in her dissent,
is the contention that the disputed programs unconstitutionally
supported religion by relieving parochial schools of the financial
burden of providing such courses themselves. 132 It is difficult to
comprehend how the off-premises educational opportunities to parochial school students approved in Wolman are less a relief of financial burden for nonpublic schools than that occasioned by holding the classes within parochial school facilities. Indeed, offpremises classes would increase the costs of the programs to taxpayers due to the added costs associated with transporting the
children to the neutral site133 and operating additional public
34
school classrooms.1
Beyond the fact that parochial schools would be relieved of financial burden whether classes are on or off the parochial school
premises, the nature of the classes being offered is also relevant to
the constitutional validity of the program. Since the classes included in the Grand Rapids programs were not required by the
O'Connor, after noting the problematic nature of the Lemon test, stated,
[T]he standards announced in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to
make them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment.
We must strive to do more than erect a constitutional "signpost" to be followed or
ignored in a particular case as our predilections may dictate. Instead, our goal should
be "to frame a principle for constitutional adjudication that is not only grounded in
the history and language of the first amendment, but one that is also capable of consistent application to the relevant problems."
105 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See generally Chopper,
Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard,47 MINN. L. REv. 329
(1963).
131. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
132. 105 S. Ct. at 3230. See also supra note 30.
133. The Everson decision would seem to allow the use of public funds for the transportation of parochial school children to and from classes. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
134. Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), noted the potential danger of increasing public costs
of education by injecting parochial school students into the public school system. 413 U.S.
at 817-18 (White, J. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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state for the nonpublic schools to maintain accreditation1 3 the
burden being lifted was a potential burden only, relying on an assumption that the parochial schools would otherwise offer such
courses. 136 By comparison, the provision of loaned textbooks for
"core" courses as approved in Allen, is a direct and certain reduction in the cost of parochial education, and property tax exemptions such as those approved by the Court in Walz, provide certain
financial relief to religious institutions.
The Court's invalidation of the Grand Rapids programs for the
additional reason that the programs fostered a perception of government support of religion is also attenuated by precedent. The
approval of municipal erection of a nativity scene and government
payment of a legislative chaplain in Lynch v. Donnelly3 7 and
Marsh v. Chambers,3 8 respectively, belie the importance of public
perceptions of government interaction with religion. 39
Moreover, there again seems to be an inconsistency in the suggestion that the perception of government support of religion
would be greater if classes were held on parochial school premises
than if held off-site. The break in routine attendant to movement
of students from their own schools to public facilities could well be
viewed by the children as preferred treatment by government. The
added visibility of such an assistance program in action would also
seem to heighten the public's perception of government support
for religion. This would be especially true if the construction of
new public facilities was necessary in order to accommodate the
parochial school children receiving off-site instruction. And yet, as
already noted, the provision of off-site educational services to parochial school students was explicitly allowed by the Court in
Wolman. 40
In substance, the Grand Rapids School District decision has little to recommend it as a standard which would lend predictability
to the effects element of the Lemon test, and its use in that fashion
would be a mistake. More appropriately, the decision should be
limited to its facts. To use it otherwise would add confusion to an
135. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
136. 105 S. Ct. at 3230.
137. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
138. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
139. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971), and Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (two cases in
which substantial financial aid to religiously affiliated colleges was approved by the Court).
See also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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already difficult constitutional problem. As Chief Justice Burger
noted in Walz, "The considerable internal inconsistency in the
opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have
been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these [religion] clauses
that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general principles."""
Frederick Denk

141.

Walz, 397 U.S. at 668.

